T. E. Lawrence And Zionism by The Historical Review Press
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T. E. Lawrence And Zionism by The Historical Review Press
INTRODUCTION TO THE THIRD EDITION
This booklet which now comes to you electronically is so persuasive that it has been translated into a dozen different languages, and conversely, has been banned or otherwise suppressed in almost as many countries.
Did Six Million Really Die? was originally published by the Historical Review Press in England in 1974. It was an immediate success and even though no bookshop would stock it, word spread fast.
A German edition was published in collaboration with former school-teacher and author Udo Walendy. A French edition was distributed by schoolteacher Francois Duprat; however tragedy struck when Duprat was murdered by a car bomb. His wife was also severely injured.
The booklet, despite some errors, had a catalytic effect. Dr Arthur Butz of Northwestern University in Chicago contracted with HRP to publish an entire scholarly book on the subject, The Hoax of the Twentieth Century. Dr. Robert Faurisson of the University of Lyons-2 in France also began to publish his own findings on the 'Holocaust'. All around the world - in the U.S., in Canada, Australia, South Africa, Sweden - 'Holocaust' Revisionists were popping out of the woodwork - many of them initially influenced by this slim pamphlet. Soon, the powers that be began to sit up and take notice. In 1976 the South African Jewish Board of Deputies applied to the Publications Control Board to have D6MRD? banned From South Africa. The local distributor S.E.D. Brown put up a brave fight hut shortage of funds and his advanced age prevented him from pursuing an effective appeal. To celebrate their brazen and successful censorship, the Deputies then published their 'case' against D6MRD? in book form, Six Million Did Die. Only a couple of the Deputies' criticisms were legitimate. The rest of the book consists of submissions from Establishment historians and politicians of every stripe, denouncing D6MRD? without presenting any factual critique. Of particular interest are the 'expert' testimony of Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper, who would later completely discredit his 'expertise' by endorsing the 'Hitler Diary' fraud; and also the submission of the 'reformed' Nazi Albert Speer, whose letter actually provides more evidence for the Revisionist position than it does for the Exterminationists. His letter is reproduced at the end of this edition of D6MRD?
In an attempt to get around the South African ban, HRP temporarily changed the title to Six Million Lost and Found. However, due to the immense popularity of the original title, we have now reverted to it.
Surrogate or 'bootleg' copies of D6MRD? then began to appear, especially in the United States and Canada. Some of these editions were authorised by HRP; many were not. In Toronto, German publisher Ernst Zundel brought out his own edition, with four pages of new introductory material. He bravely mailed free copies to Canadian Members of Parliament, clergy, journalists and broadcasters. Anxious to create a 'story', one staffer of the Canadian Broadcasting Company showed a copy to a professional 'survivor' Mrs. Sabina Citron, who runs her own maverick Holocaust Remembrance Association. Enraged at the existence of such dissident ideas, and put on the spot by the CBC reporter, Mrs. Citron filed a private legal complaint against Zundel, under a very obscure and obsolete law, prohibiting the publication of 'False News'. She then insisted that the Crown take over the prosecution of the case at taxpayers' expense. Even though Mrs. Citron's group had been expelled from the Toronto Jewish Federation, and even though she herself had been in trouble with the law, the petrified Crown Attorney's office meekly agreed to her demands. Just for good measure, they also added to the charge a recent flyer Zundel had published (but again, not written). Zundel was arraigned and a preliminary hearing was held in June 1984.
The Crown exhibited eleven witnesses. There were two Holocaust 'experts': John Fried and Raul Hilberg. However, Fried's testimony was so weak, and his political perspective so transparently leftist, that he was not called to the main trial. Two survivors were featured: Mrs. Sabina Citron and Arnold Friedman. Mrs. Citron's narrative of her war-time experiences was so mundane that, much to her chagrin, she too would not be asked to testify at the main trial. Although Zundel had thoroughly prepared for the hearing, by bringing in Revisionist scholars from around the world, his lawyer at that time was totally unfamiliar with the issues. Consequently, Hilberg & Co. smugly thought the main trial would be an easy victory.
At the time the main trial opened in January 1985, Zundel had located a new lawyer, a dynamic, aggressive and talented Westerner, Doug Christie. Although he had had no previous exposure to Revisionism he grasped the arguments immediately. Again, Zundel brought in teams of his own experts, both to prepare the research for Christie, and themselves to testify during the Defence portion of the case. Ironically, both the Defence and Prosecution agreed that D6MRD? was largely correct and that only small points were in error. But the Crown had set out to prove that the entire Revisionist thesis was incorrect, and thus it turned out that it was actually the 'Holocaust' which was on trial. Christie took full advantage of the situation by ruthlessly grilling the entire slate of prosecution witnesses. A stunned Hilberg retreated further and further in his testimony; so much so that he was later chastised by American Jewish groups for putting up such a feeble performance.
Although the judge at the preliminary had been a disinterested 'good ol' boy' the main trial was presided over by an extremely hostile and biased judge Hugh Locke. It was later discovered that when he was a barrister his own law-firm had done legal work for Mrs. Citron's Holocaust Remembrance Association! Locke allowed the Crown to introduce all kinds of hearsay evidence, particularly an emotive movie film.
After seven and a half weeks the jury eventually found Zundel guilty regarding D6MRD? (but not guilty as regards the other leaflet) He was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment, with automatic deportation afterwards. Despite the severity of the sentence Canadian Jews were despondent, and many complained bitterly and openly that the trial had only given the Revisionists a platform for their 'obnoxious' views. Indeed, Zundel regarded the outcome as a victory. He had aired Revisionist arguments to the public; there had been very heavy and fairly accurate media coverage throughout the trial. And as a result he had recruited vast numbers of new supporters who had never heard his message before.
In Britain, where it is not an offence to deny the Holocaust, an official of the Jewish Board of Deputies said that a prosecution would only bring undesirable publicity. However, other members of the Jewish community had different ideas.
In 1980 a Jewish journalist employed by a communist publication misnamed Searchlight decided; with accomplices, to destroy the premises of a firm thought to be producing D6MRD? causing damage to the extent of 60,000 British pounds. This man, with two previous convictions, was quickly apprehended and later sentenced to an inadequate prison term of two and a half years. In May 1987 a man, quite properly, was sentenced to 4 years for arson against a Jewish Synagogue: damage; 500 pounds. He had no previous convictions. His defence was that his father had been murdered by Jews in Palestine.
Since we here at Historical Review Press value accuracy, we have responded to criticisms of D6MRD? by correcting in this third edition those few errors which existed. Most of these mistakes were transposed into the earlier editions from previous works. It should be borne in mind that Rassinier, for example, was totally alone and without resources, so it is not surprising that his pioneering studies contained some errors, which would be later repeated in earlier editions of D6MRD? We hope that we have now eliminated all of these.
We are extremely grateful to the Canadian government for drawing our attention to these few errors, so that we can correct them, but we do question whether it was worth them spending millions of their taxpayers' dollars in the process, when a 50c stamp on a letter to us would have sufficed.
CHAPTER 1
GERMAN POLICY TOWARDS THE JEWS PRIOR TO THE WAR [Remember, blue is the original and red is the lie inserted by the disinformationist website]
Rightly or wrongly, the Germany of Adolf Hitler considered the Jews to be a disloyal and avaricious element within the national community, as well as a force of decadence in Germany's cultural life. This was held to be particularly unhealthy since, during the Weimar period, the Jews had risen to a position of remarkable strength and influence in the nation, particularly in law, finance and the mass media, even though they constituted only (5 / one) percent of the population. The fact that Karl Marx was a Jew and that Jews such as Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht were disproportion-ately prominent in the leadership of communist movements in Germany also tended to convince the Nazis of the powerful internationalist and Communist tendencies of the Jewish people.
It is no part of the discussion here to argue whether the German attitude to the Jews was right or not, or to judge whether its legislative measures against them were just or unjust. Our concern is simply with the fact that, believing of the Jews as they did, the Nazis' solution to the problem was to deprive them of their influence within the nation by various legislative acts, and most important of all, to encourage their emigration from the country altogether. By 1939, the great majority of German Jews had emigrated, all of them with a sizeable proportion of their assets. Never at any time had the Nazi leadership even contemplated a policy of genocide towards them.
JEWS CALLED EMIGRATION 'EXTERMINATION'
It is very significant, however, that certain Jews were quick to interpret these policies of internal discrimination as equivalent to extermination itself. A 1936 anti-German propaganda book by Leon Feuchtwanger and others entitled Der Gelbe Fleck: Die Ausrotung von 500,000 Deutsche Juden (The Yellow Spot: The Extermination of 500,000 German Jews, | The Outlawing of half a million Human Beings, Paris, 1936), presents a typical example. Despite its baselessness in fact, the annihilation of the Jews is discussed from the first pages - straightforward emigration being regarded as the physical "extermination" of German Jewry. The Nazi concentration camps for political prisoners are also seen as potential instruments of genocide, and special reference is made to the 100 Jews still detained in Dachau in 1936, of whom 60 had been there since 1933. A further example was the sensational book by the German - Jewish Communist, Hans Beimler, called Four Weeks in the Hands of Hitler's Hell Hounds: The Nazi Murder Camp of Dachau, which was published in New York as early as 1933. Detained for his Marxist affiliations, he claimed that Dachau was a death camp, though by his own admission he was released after only a month there. The [present | post-War] Communist regime in East Germany used to issue a 'Hans Beimler Award' for services to Communism.
The fact that anti-Nazi genocide propaganda was being disseminated at this impossibly early date therefore, by people biased on racial or -political grounds, should suggest great caution to the independent minded observer when approaching similar stories of the war period.
The encouragement of Jewish emigration should not be confused with the purpose of concentration camps in pre-war Germany. These were used for the detention of political opponents and subversives - principally liberals, Social Democrats and Communists of all kinds, a proportion of whom were Jews, such as Hans Beimler. Unlike the millions enslaved in the Soviet Union, the German concentration camp population was always small; Reitlinger admits that between 1934 and 1938 it seldom exceeded 20,000 throughout the whole of Germany and the number of Jews was never more than 3,000. (The S.S.: Alibi of a Nation, London, 1956, p 253.)
ZIONIST POLICY STUDIED
The Nazi view of Jewish emigration was not limited to a negative policy of simple expulsion but was formulated along the lines of modern Zionism. The founder of political Zionism in the 19th century, Theodore Herzl, in his work The Jewish State, had originally conceived of Madagascar as a national homeland for the Jews and this possibility was seriously studied by the Nazis. It had been a main plank of the National Socialist party platform before 1933 and was published by the party in pamphlet form. This stated that the revival of Israel as a Jewish state was much less acceptable since it would result in perpetual war and disruption in the Arab world, which has indeed been the case. The Germans were not original in proposing Jewish emigration to Madagascar; the Polish Government had already considered the scheme in respect of their own Jewish population and in 1937 they sent the Michael Lepecki expedition to Madagascar, accompanied by Jewish representatives, to investigate the problems involved.
The first Nazi proposals for a Madagascar solution were made in association with the Schacht Plan of 1938. On the advice of Goering, Hitler agreed to send the President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, to London for discussions with Jewish representatives Lord Bearsted and Mr. Rublee of New York (cf. Reitlinger, The Final Solution, London, 1953, p. 20). The plan was that German Jewish assets would be frozen as security for an international loan to finance Jewish emigration to Palestine and Schacht reported on these negotiations to Hitler at Berchtesgaden on January 2, 1939. The plan, which failed due to British refusal to accept the financial terms, was first put forward on November 12, 1938 at a conference convened by Goering, who revealed that Hitler was already considering the emigration of Jews to a settlement in Madagascar (ibid., p. 21). Later, in December, Ribbentrop was told by M. Georges Bonnet, the French Foreign Secretary, that the French Government itself was planning the evacuation of 10,000 Jews to Madagascar.
Prior to Schacht's Palestine proposals of 1938, which were essentially a protraction of discussions that had begun as early as 1935, numerous attempts had been made to secure Jewish emigration to other European nations and these efforts culminated in the Evian Conference of July 1938. However by 1939 the scheme of Jewish emigration to Madagascar had gained most favor in German circles. It is true that in London Helmuth Wohltat of the German Foreign Office discussed limited Jewish emigration to Rhodesia and British Guiana as late as April 1939, but by Jan. 24th when Goering wrote to Interior Minister Frick ordering the creation of a Central Emigration Office for Jews, and commissioned Heydrich of the Reich Security Office to solve the Jewish problem "by means of emigration and evacuation". The Madagascar plan was being studied in earnest. By 1939, the consistent efforts of the German government to secure the departure of Jews from the Reich had resulted in the emigration of 400,000 German Jews from a total population of about 600,000, and an additional 480,000 emigrants from Austria and Czechoslovakia, which constituted almost their entire Jewish populations. This was accomplished through Offices of Jewish Emigration in Berlin, Vienna and Prague established by Adolf Eichmann, the head of the Jewish Investigation Office of the Gestapo .
So eager were the Germans to secure this emigration that Eichmann even established a training centre in Austria, where young Jews could learn farming in anticipation of being smuggled illegally to Palestine (Manvell & Frankl, S.S. and Gestapo, p. 60). Had Hitler cherished any intention of exterminating the Jews, it is inconceivable that he would have allowed more than 800,000 to leave Reich territory with the bulk of their wealth, much less considered plans for their mass emigration to Palestine or Madagascar.
What is more, we shall see that the policy of emigration from Europe was still under consideration well into the war period, notably the Madagascar Plan, which Eichmann discussed in 1940 with French Colonial Office experts after the defeat of France had made the surrender of the colony a practical proposition.
CHAPTER 2
GERMAN POLICY TOWARDS THE JEWS AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
With the coming of the war the situation regarding the Jews altered drastically. It is not widely known that world Jewry declared itself to be a belligerent party in the Second World War, and there was therefore ample basis under international law for the Germans to intern the Jewish population as a hostile force. On September 5, 1939 Chaim Weizmann, the principal Zionist leader, had declared war against Germany on behalf of the world's Jews, stating that "the Jews stand by Great Britain and will fight on the side of the democracies... The Jewish Agency is ready to enter into immediate arrangements for utilizing Jewish manpower, technical ability, resources etc..." (Jewish Chronicle, September 8, 1939).
DETENTION OF ENEMY ALIENS
All Jews had thus been declared agents willing to prosecute a war against the German Reich and, as a consequence, Himmler and Heydrich were eventually to begin the policy of internment. It is worth noting that the United States and Canada had already interned all Japanese aliens and citizens of Japanese descent in detention camps before the Germans applied the same security measures against the Jews of Europe. Moreover, there had been no such evidence or declaration of disloyalty by these Japanese Americans as had been given by Weizmann. The British too, during the Boer War, interned all the women and children of the population and thousands had died as a result, yet in no sense could the British be charged with wanting to exterminate the Boers.
The detention of Jews in the occupied territories of Europe served two essential purposes from the German viewpoint. The first was to prevent unrest and subversion; Himmler informed Mussolini on October 11, 1942 that German policy towards the Jews had altered during wartime entirely for reasons of military security. He complained that thousands of Jews in the occupied regions were conducting partisan warfare, sabotage and espionage, a view confirmed by official Soviet information given to Raymond Arthur Davis that no less than 35,000 European Jews were waging partisan war under Tito in Yugoslavia. As a result, Jews were to be transported to restricted areas and detention camps, both in Germany, and especially after March 1942, in the Government-General of Poland.
As the war proceeded, the policy developed of using Jewish detainees for labour in the war-effort. The question of labour is fundamental when considering the alleged plan of genocide against the Jews, for on grounds of logic alone the latter would entail the most senseless waste of manpower, time and energy while prosecuting a war of survival on two fronts. Certainly after the attack on Russia, the idea of compulsory labour had taken precedence over German plans for Jewish emigration. The protocol of a conversation between Hitler and the Hungarian regent Horthy on April 17, 1943, reveals that the German leader personally requested Horthy to release 100,000 Hungarian Jews for work in the "pursuit-plane programme" of the Luftwaffe at a time when the aerial bombardment of Germany was increasing (Reitlinger, Die Endliisung, Berlin, 1956, p. 478). This took place at a time when, supposedly, the Germans were already seeking to exterminate the Jews, but Hitler's request clearly demonstrates the priority aim of expanding his labour force.
In harmony with this programme, concentration camps became, in fact, industrial complexes. At every camp where Jews and other nationalities were detained, there were large industrial plants and factories supplying material for the German war-effort: the Buna rubber factory at Bergen-Belsen, for example, Buna and 1.IG. Farben Industrie at Auschwitz, and the electrical firm of Siemens at Ravensbriick. In many cases, special concentration camp money notes were issued as payment for labour, enabling prisoners to buy extra rations from camp shops. The Germans were determined to obtain the maximum economic return from the concentration camp system, an object wholly at variance with any plan to exterminate millions of people in them. It was the function of the S.S. Economy and Administration Office, headed by Oswald Pohl, to see that the concentration camps became major industrial producers.
EMIGRATION STILL FAVOURED
It is a remarkable fact however, that well into the war period, the Germans continued to implement the policy of Jewish emigration. The fall of France in 1940 enabled the German Government to open serious negotiations with the French for the transfer of European Jews to Madagascar. A memorandum of August, 1942 from Luther, Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office, reveals that he had conducted these negotiations between July and December 1940, when they were terminated by the French. A circular from Luther's department dated August 15, 1940 shows that the details of the German plan had been worked out by Eichmann, for it is signed by his assistant, Dannecker. Eichmann had in fact been commissioned in August to draw up a detailed Madagascar Plan, and Dannecker was employed in research on Madagascar at the French Colonial Office (Reitlinger, The Final Solution, p. 77).
The proposals of August 15 were that an inter-European bank was to finance the emigration of four million Jews by means of a phased programme. Luther's 1942 memorandum shows that Heydrich had obtained Himmler's approval of this plan before the end of August and had also submitted it to Goering. It certainly met with Hitler's approval, for as early as June 17 his interpreter, Schmidt, recalls Hitler observing to Mussolini that "One could found a State of Israel in Madagascar" (Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter, London, 1951, p. 178).
Although the French terminated the Madagascar negotiations in December 1940, Poliakov, the director of the Centre of Jewish Documentation in Paris, admits that the Germans nevertheless pursued the scheme and that Eichmann was still busy with it throughout 1941. Eventually however it was rendered impractical by the progress of the war, in particular by the situation after the invasion of Russia, and on February 10, 1942 the Foreign Office was informed that the plan had been temporarily shelved. This ruling, sent to the Foreign Office by Luther's assistant, Rademacher, is of great importance because it demonstrates conclusively that the term "Final Solution" meant only the emigration of Jews, and also that transportation to the eastern ghettos and concentration camps such as Auschwitz constituted nothing but an alternative plan of evacuation.
The directive reads: "The war with the Soviet Union has in the meantime created the possibility of disposing of other territories for the Final Solution. In consequence the Fuehrer has decided that the Jews should be evacuated not to Madagascar but to the East. Madagascar need no longer therefore be considered in connection with the Final Solution" (Reitlinger, ibid. p. 79). The details of this evacuation had been discussed a month earlier at the Wannsee Conference in Berlin, which we shall examine below.
Reitlinger and Poliakov both make the entirely unfounded supposition that because the Madagascar Plan had been shelved, the Germans must necessarily have been thinking of "extermination". Only a month later, however, on March 7, 1942, Goebbels wrote a memorandum in favour of the Madagascar Plan as a "Final Solution" of the Jewish question (Manvell & Frankl, Dr. Goebbels, London, 1960). In the meantime he approved of the Jews being "concentrated in the East". Later Goebbels' memoranda also stress deportation to the East (i.e.-the Government General of Poland) and lay emphasis on the need for compulsory labour there; once the policy of evacuation to the East had been inaugurated, the use of Jewish labour became a fundamental part of the operation. It is perfectly clear from the foregoing that the term "Final Solution" was applied both to Madagascar and to the Eastern territories and that therefore it meant only the deportation of the Jews.
Even as late as May 1944 the Germans were prepared to allow the emigration of one million European Jews from Europe. An account of this proposal is given by Alexander Weissberg, a prominent Soviet Jewish scientist deported during the Stalin purges, in his book Die Geschichte von Joel Brand (Cologne, 1956). Weissberg, who spent the war in Cracow though he expected the Germans to intern him in a concentration camp, explains that on the personal authorisation of Himmler, Eichmann had sent the Budapest Jewish leader Joel Brand to Istanbul with an offer to the Allies to permit the transfer of one million European Jews in the midst of the war. (if the 'extermination' writers are to be believed, there were scarcely one million Jews left by May, 1944.) The Gestapo admitted that the transportation involved would greatly inconvenience the German war-effort but were prepared to allow it in exchange for 10,000 trucks to be used exclusively on the Russian front.
Unfortunately, the plan came to nothing: the British concluded that Brand must be a dangerous Nazi agent and immediately imprisoned him in Cairo while the Press denounced the offer as a Nazi trick. Winston Churchill, though orating to the effect that the treatment of the Hungarian Jews was probably "the biggest and most horrible crime ever committed in the whole history of the world" nevertheless told Chaim Weizmann that acceptance of the Brand offer was impossible, since it would be a betrayal of his Russian Allies.
Although the plan was fruitless it well illustrates that no one allegedly carrying out "thorough" extermination would permit the emigration of a million Jews and it demonstrates, too, the prime importance placed by the Germans on the war-effort.
Comments
Re: T. E. Lawrence and Zionism from Virginia F. Raines
The Cairo-Khartoum school found an unexpected ally in the first chief of the civil administration, Sir Herbert Samuel. Samuel, precisely because he was a Jew, soon found himself in the position of either following the advice of his subordinates or being considered insufficiently British. In striking contrast to his English soldier-successor, Lord Plumer, who adhered as best he could to the status quo and to the brief he had from Whitehall, Samuel allowed his administration to develop naturally the anti-Zionist themes of the military administration it had replaced. An anti-Zionist official named Ernest T. Richmond, in government employ as an architect, was manoeuvred by Storrs (as is now made clear by the British government archives) into the post of assistant secretary (political), whose duties were formally those of chief adviser to the High Commissioner on Moslem affairs.7
British advice to Arab agitator-leaders
Richmond, receiving a salary to carry out the London government's official policy, openly spent his time in the administration on efforts to undermine it. He gave advice to the Arab agitator-leaders. He became their intermediary and self-appointed spokesman. It was at the initiative and under the tutelage of Richmond, Storrs, and their colleagues, and under their inspiration, that the Sherifian instigators of the pogrom of 1920 were now brought back into the arena to build up a political machine so that they could claim to speak for the "Arabs of Palestine."
Haj Amin el Husseini was hiding across the Jordan to avoid serving his jail sentence. Since no other candidate for this kind of leadership had appeared among the Arabs, Samuel was persuaded by Storrs to pardon Haj Amin -- and his colleague Aref el Aref -- as a "gesture"; and they returned to Jerusalem. When the incumbent Mufti of Jerusalem died soon afterward, the Moslem religious leaders convened as an electoral college to recommend a short list of three candidates from whom the High Commissioner would have to make the appointment. Haj Amin entered the contest. He had no special qualification to be the head of Moslem community in the city. He was twenty-years old and his education must have been over well before he was twenty-one, since he had served in the Turkish Army certainly before 1917. In the poll, he received the lowest number of votes and thus could not be included in the recommended list of three.
Richmond launched an energetic campaign to get Samuel to appoint him nevertheless. He urged upon him the "expert" view that the poll was unimportant, that Haj Amin was the man the "Moslem population" insisted on. A virulent agitation was let loose within the Moslem community against the successful candidate, Sheikh Jurallah, who was described, among other things, as a Zionist who intended to sell Moslem holy property to the Jews. Samuel gave way. He did not in fact send Haj Amin the letter of appointment and it was never gazetted. Haj Amin simply "became" the Mufti of Jerusalem. Thus, this man, imposed on the Moslem community, became and remained, for most of the crucial years of the Mandate, the director and spearhead of the war on Zionism.
The Moslem dignitaries, whom even the backward Turks had not accustomed to such outrageous interference or dictation, nevertheless took the hint. They knew now beyond any doubt what the British power expected of them.
When he started on his career, however, Haj Amin's followers were few, and he had no sources of finance for the political task projected for him. This, too, had been thought of. The administration then set up a body called the Supreme Moslem Council. Haj Amin, now clothed with the authority of Mufti and authentic favourite of the British, was elected its president without difficulty. His position was entrenched: The appointment was for life, so that no opposition could ever unseat him democratically. He and his pliant subordinates became the arbiters of all Moslem religious endowments and expenditure. Many Moslems became dependent on him for their livelihood. He controlled an annual income of more than pound sterling 100,000, for which he was not accountable. (By today's values, this would be equivalent in purchasing power to about $2 million.) Such was the origin of the organised "national movement" of the "Arabs of Palestine."
Haj Husseini's next attack, the defenceless Yeshiva community of Hebron in 1929
The means of organising propaganda and violence against Zionism and the pattern of its organisation were thus assured. A short localised attack took place in 1921 and simultaneous onslaught in several areas in 1929. This latter attack was again distinguished by the choice of helpless, defenceless people as its target-in Hebron the bulk of the community of rabbis and yeshiva students and their wives and children were slaughtered -- and by the blatantly benevolent neutrality of the British forces of law and order, one of whose first acts was to disarm the Jewish villages. In 1936 came the last and most protracted offensive, officially organised by an informal political body called the Arab Higher Committee; it was led by Haj Amin el Husseini, still Mufti and still President of the Moslem Supreme Council.
In the intervening years, the men of the Cairo school -- as they progressively increased their dominance in Palestine as well as over the central policies in the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office -- were able to deepen and diversify their campaign against Zionism. During those years, their propaganda identified Zionism with Bolshevism -- an image carrying instant demonic conviction with devout Christians as well as devout Moslems. During those years, the Lawrence myth was built into the popular history of the age, and with it the story of the "Arab Revolt" gained credence. Now the Arabs, and even the Arabs of Palestine, gradually came to play a major role in the liberation of the country from the Turks. Now, too, the claim promoted by Lawrence and embellished by Oriental imagination about how the Arabs had been "let down" by the British was broadcast as historic truth. The very real and significant Jewish share in Allenby's campaign in Palestine on both sides of the Jordan was not mentioned.
The Balfour Declaration had become a document to protect the rights of Arabs, not Jews
The Balfour Declaration was somehow twisted at one and the same time into a discreditable transaction and a meaningless document that promised the Jews nothing, and guarenteed the rights of Arabs over Jews in Palestine.
During those years, in order to match the unique relationship of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, the "rights of the Palestine Arabs" were manufactured and endowed with the fictitious historical continuity which serves as the substance of present-day Arab propaganda.
1. J. E. Hubbard to Occupied Enemy Territory Administration, November 20, 1918. Israel State Archives, Pal. Govt. Secretariat File No. 40. Quoted in Y. Porat, Tsemihat Hatenua Ha'aravit Hapalestinait 1918-1929 (Tel Aviv, 1971), P. 24.
2. Samuel, Unholy Memories, p. 9.
3. Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary 1917-1956 (London, 1959), pp. 55-56.
4. Report of Court of Enquiry, FO 371/5121, p. 38.
5. Henrietta Szold, the American Zionist leader, described Storrs as "an evil genius, who despises Jews." Marvin Lowenthal, Henrietta Szold (New York, 1942), pp. 186-187.
6. T. E. Lawrence, Secret Despatches from Arabia (London, 1939), p. 158.
7. FO 371/5267 file E 9433/8343/44; FO 371/5268 files E 11720/8343/44, 11835/8343/44.
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On Thu, Oct 2, 2008 at 5:43 PM, Lal Gehi wrote:
"We want no progress, no prosperity. Nothing but the sword will decide the fate of this country." --
What a statement. !!
That is why, Saudi Arabia national flag, proudly displays a sword. !!
Perhaps the sword is sign of peace, pride, and victory, for Muslims. !!
--- On Thu, 10/2/08, Virginia F. Raines wrote:
From: Virginia F. Raines
Subject: T. E. Lawrence and Zionism
Date: Thursday, October 2, 2008, 5:17 PM
"We want no progress, no prosperity. Nothing but the sword will decide the fate of this country." --
Haj Amin El Husseini - Palestinian leader and former Grand Mufti, reviewing Nazi Troops.
Palestinian leader, Former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin Al Husseini, shown reviewing Nazi troops on the cover of the Vienna Illustrated (Wiener Illustrierte) magazine.
Meeting between Feisal and Weizmann, December 1918 (Wilson pp. 592-3)
On [11 December 1918], there was a meeting between Feisal and Chaim Weizmann, during which Lawrence acted as interpreter. Both leaders were now in a position to help one another politically: the Zionists needed Arab acquiescence to their programme in Palestine, while Feisal knew that Jewish support during the Peace Conference might help to swing American opinion behind his cause. Lawrence had already impressed upon Feisal the potential value of Jewish capital and skills.
According to his own contemporary account, Weizmann assured Feisal that the Zionists in Palestine 'should . . . be able to carry out public works of a far-reaching character, and . . . the country could be so improved that it would have room for four or five million Jews, without encroaching on the ownership rights of Arab peasantry.'61
Feisal replied that 'it was curious there should be friction between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. There was no friction in any other country where Jews lived together with Arabs . . . He did not think for a moment that there was any scarcity of land in Palestine. The population would always have enough, especially if the country were developed. Besides, there was plenty of land in his district.'62
Notes:
61. C. Weizmann: 'Dr. Weizmann's interview with Emir Faisal at the Carlton Hotel, December 11th 1918. Colonel Lawrence acting as interpreter.' FO371/3420.
62. Ibid. There were further contacts between Feisal and Weizmann in London, and on 3 January 1919 they signed an 'Agreement between the King of thre Hedjaz and the Zionists'. The text is reprinted in D. Hunter Miller, My Diaries of the Conference of Paris (New York, Appeal Printing, 1924), Vol. 3, p.p. 188-9.
T. E. Lawrence and Zionism
Extracts from Lawrence of Arabia, The Authorised Biography by Jeremy Wilson (London, Heinemann, 1989; New York, Atheneum, 1990) and other sources.
In quoting these extracts in isolation, we have assumed that readers have a general knowledge of the diplomatic background, the history of undertakings given by Britain to the Arabs, and the progress of the war in the Middle East.
Meetings between Lawrence and Aaron Aaronsohn, a radical Zionist, Jerusalem, 1917
[Aaronsohn] had met Lawrence as early as February 1917, and had noted in his diary, '. . . A new appearance in the Arab Bureau - 2nd Lieutenant Lawrence, archaeologist, very versed in Palestinian topics. Overbearing.'
On 12 August 1917, according to the diary, they met again. 'This morning I had a conversation with Capt. Lawrence. An interview without any evidence of friendliness. Lawrence had too much success at too early an age. Has a very high estimation of his own self. He is lecturing me on our colonies, on the spirit of the people, on the feelings of the Arabs, and we would do well in being assimilated by them, by the sons of Arab etc. While listening to him I imagined to be present at the lecture of a Prussian scientific anti-Semite expressing himself in English. I am afraid that many of the archaeologists and reverends have been imbued by 'l'esprit boche'. He is openly against us. He is basically of missionary stock'
Harsh words indeed; in contradiction of the words used by Weizmann. As far as we know Aaronsohn did not change his mind. He continued to see in T. E. Lawrence the close associate of Feisal, the 'Bedouins' and the 'Arabs' of whom he had the lowest opinion.
Source: Amram Scheyer, 'The Lawrence - Aaronsohn Relationship' Journal of the T. E. Lawrence Society, Vol. V, No. 1, Autumn 1995. This article is available online.
1) T. E. Lawrence's letter to Sir Mark Sykes, 9 September 1917 (Wilson pp. 442-3)
[Sir Mark] Sykes's letter to [Gilbert] Clayton [of 22 July 1917*] also contained a passing reference to the Zionist question. It was well known that he was interested in this subject, and the British staff in Egypt also knew that some kind of discussions on the matter were taking place in London. Jewish ambitions in Palestine were common knowledge in Cairo, where Aaron Aaronson, a prominent figure in the movement, was hoping to set up a Zionist office. Lawrence had good reason to be interested in a question that so obviously affected the aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs.
On September 7th, he wrote to Sykes at length, asking both about Zionist aims and about the future of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. He sent this letter to Clayton, with the comment: 'Some of it is really thirst for information, and other is only a wish to stick pins into him . . . One must have the Jewish section cleared up: and I fancy we may (if we win) clear up the French section ourselves.'15
Lawrence wrote to Sykes: 'General Clayton showed me a letter from you which contained a message to myself - and this has prompted me to ask you a few queries about Near East affairs. I hope you will be able to give me an idea of how matters stand in reference to them, since part of the responsibility of action is inevitably thrown on to me, and unless I know more or less what is wanted there might be trouble.
'About the Jews in Palestine, Feisal has agreed not to operate or agitate west of the [Wadi] Araba-Dead Sea-Jordan line, or south of the Haifa-Beisan line . . .
'You know of course the root differences between the Palestine Jew and the colonist Jew: to Feisal the important point is that the former speak Arabic, and the latter German Yiddish. He is in touch with the Arab Jews (their H.Q. at Safed and Tiberias is in his sphere) and they are ready to help him, on conditions. They show a strong antipathy to the colonist Jews, and have even suggested repressive measures against them. Feisal has ignored this point hitherto, and will continue to do so. His attempts to get into touch with the colonial Jews have not been very fortunate. They say they have made their arrangements with the Great Powers, and wish no contact with the Arab Party. They will not help the Turks or the Arabs.
'Now Feisal wants to know (information had better come to me for him since I usually like to make up my mind before he does) what is the arrangement standing between the colonist Jews (called Zionists sometimes) and the Allies . . . What have you promised the Zionists, and what is their programme?
'I saw Aaronson in Cairo, and he said at once the Jews intended to acquire the land-rights of all Palestine from Gaza to Haifa, and have practical autonomy therein. Is this acquisition to be by fair purchase or by forced sale and expropriation? The present half-crop peasantry were the old freeholders and under Moslem landlords may be ground down but have fixity of tenure. Arabs are usually not employed by Jewish colonies. Do the Jews propose the complete expulsion of the Arab peasantry, or their reduction to a day-labourer class?
'You know how the Arabs cling even to bad land and will realise that while Arab feelings didn't matter under Turkish rule . . . the condition will be vastly different if there is a new, independent, and rather cock-a-hoop Arab state north and east and south of the Jewish state.
I can see a situation arising in which the Jewish influence in European finance might not be sufficient to deter the Arab peasants from refusing to quit - or worse!
* Sir T. B. M. Sykes to G. F. Clayton 22.7.1917. Sykes Papers, St. Antony's College, Oxford.
Note 15. T. E. Lawrence to G. F. Clayton 7.9.1917. Clayton Pape5rs 693/11/9-12, Durham (photocopy of original).
2. Sykes-Picot and the Balfour Declaration published (Wilson pp. 467-9)
Lawrence's visit to Cairo [in December1917] also enabled him to catch up on Intelligence about recent political developments. Among the most serious questions to be faced were those which had been raised by the Bolshevik Revolution of early November. The new Russian regime was vehemently opposed to the war and had taken immediate steps to reach an armistice with the Central Powers. This meant that Turkey would soon be able to transfer troops from the Caucasus Front to Palestine and Mesopotamia.
The Revolution had another disconcerting consequence. Within days of seizing control, the Bolsheviks had published secret Allied treaties including the Sykes-Picot Agreement. During the following weeks, these texts had appeared in newspapers throughout the world. The Sykes-Picot terms were a gift to Turkish propaganda, and British officials had waited anxiously for Arab reaction.
This had not been slow in coming. On November 26th, Wilson reported that Hussein had 'hinted that H. M. Government possibly had some secret understanding with France and that Zeid and Feisal were being delayed by us from advancing north on this account . . . the King expressed his distrust of French policy and . . . stated that Syria was his . . . His honour was concerned . . . as he had promised the Syrians he would give them help and never desert them.'11
It was feared that Arab support might disappear completely unless the Allies took some step to counteract the damage done by the Sykes-Picot revelation. The situation was made still more fraught by the release, at much the same time, of the Balfour Declaration, which provided for a Jewish 'national home' in Palestine. Reviewing the situation, Clayton wrote to Sykes: 'The lack of any definite pronouncement against annexation, especially in Syria, is causing distrust and uneasiness . . . The general principles of the Anglo-French Agreement are known, but there is still no certain knowledge of Entente intentions for the future. As regards Syria, there is an impression that we may be only marking time until our military successes place us in a position to hand [it] over to France with as few pledges as possible. This suspicion is ever present in the mind of the Sherif of Mecca . . .
'The recent announcement of His Majesty's Government on the Jewish question has made a profound impression on both Christians and Moslems who view with little short of dismay the prospect of seeing Palestine and even eventually Syria in the hands of the Jews, whose superior intelligence and commercial abilities are feared . . .
'All the above facts tend to prepare the ground for German-inspired . . . propaganda and pave the way for an attractive proposal [to the Arabs] for independence under nominal Turkish suzerainty . . .'12
Notes:
11. C. E. Wilson to Arab Bureau for Sir F. R, Wingate, telegram W1966, 16.11.1917. FO 141/654/356.
12. G. F. Clayton to Sir T. B. M. Sykes, transmitted in Sir F. R. Wingate to Foreign Office, London, telegram 1281, 28.11.1917. Sykes Papers, St. Antony's College, Oxford.
The situation in May 1918 (Wilson pp. 502-3)
Lawrence realised that the delay in Palestine [because Allenby was obliged to return troops to Europe] would be a severe blow to the Arabs. In the first place, he had been counting on Allenby's forward movement to resolve the dangerous stalemate at Maan. Now, however, the Turks would be free to concentrate their attention on Jaafar Pasha's army. They were already building up their forces near Amman, and an attack seemed imminent. If they were allowed to move south, the Arabs might soon be driven back off the Maan plateau.
In the longer term, the delay could have even more serious consequences. Lawrence later wrote: 'We on the Arab front had been exciting Eastern Syria, since 1916, for a revolt near Damascus, and our material was now ready and afoot. To hold it still in that excited readiness during another year risked our over-passing the crisis ineffectually.'1
The risk of declining morale among Feisal's present forces was no less worrying: 'This was now 1918, and stalemate across its harvest would have marked the ebb of Feisal's movement. His fellows were living on their nerves (rebellion is harder than war) and their nerves were wearing thin. Also the big war was not looking too well.'2
These difficulties had to be seen in the context of a much wider anxiety. Since the autumn of 1917, the Anglo-Arab alliance had been under great strain. The cause was Arab knowledge of the Sykes-Picot terms (greatly exploited by Turkish propaganda) and of the Balfour Declaration. These agreements affected Syria, Lebanon, Mesopotamia and Palestine. If they were implemented, only the Arabian Peninsula would be autonomous. In other words, the richest and most fertile of the Arab provinces had been reserved for the Allies, and political independence was to be denied to the overwhelming majority of Turkey's subject peoples. Arab leaders felt cheated of much that they had been fighting for, and bitterly angry that they had not been consulted about these agreements.
Their principal reason for continuing the alliance with Britain was a belief that the Allies would win the war. During the spring of 1918, however, even this seemed open to doubt. The EEF advance to Jerusalem and Jericho had been impressive, but there it had stopped, to be followed only by two disastrous raids across the Jordan which had done immeasurable damage to British prestige. Arab suspicions that the Allies might be weakening had been reinforced by news of the successful German offensive in Europe.3
Notes
1. T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars, 1922 text, Chapter 110.
2. T. E. Lawrence, comment on the typescript draft of 'T.E. Lawrence' in Arabia and After by B. H. Liddell Hart. B:LH pp 113-4.
3. German forces had launched a major offensive on the Western Front on 21 March 1918 and, within four months, recovered all the territory that the Allies had gained since 1915.
3. Weizmann's meeting with Emir Feisal, 4 June 1918 (Wilson pp. 512-14)
There had been another important diplomatic contact while Lawrence was away in the north. This was a visit to Feisal's camp by Dr Chaim Weizmann, a leading British Zionist. Some weeks earlier, Weizmann had arrived in Palestine at the head of a Zionist Commission authorised by the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet. The Commission's objects, according to a telegram to Wingate from the Foreign Office, were 'to carry out, subject to General Allenby's authority, any steps required to give effect to the Government declaration in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people . . . Among the important functions of the Commission will be the establishment of good relations with the Arabs and other non-Jewish communities in Palestine . . . It is most important that everything should be done to . . . allay Arab suspicions regarding the true aims of Zionism'.29
Clayton, who was closely involved in the administration of Palestine, hoped that the mission would help to reduce hostility between Jews and Arabs. He had written to Sykes on February 4th: 'I have urged Lawrence to impress on Faisal the necessity of an entente with the Jews. [Feisal] is inclined the other way, and there are people in Cairo who lose no chance of putting him against them. I have explained that it is his only chance of doing really big things and bringing the Arab movement to fruition.'30 Subsequently, Lawrence had told Clayton: '[As] for the Jews, when I see Feisul next I'll talk to him, and the Arab attitude shall be sympathetic, for the duration of the war at least. Only please remember that he is under the old man, and cannot involve the Arab kingdom by himself.' He would advise Feisal to visit Jerusalem when the demands of the campaign permitted, and 'all the Jews there will report him friendly. That will probably do all you need, without public commitment, which is rather beyond my province.'31
In late May, a message had been sent to Akaba proposing a meeting between Feisal and Weizmann, who would be accompanied by a liaison officer: 'The interview would take place at Arab Headquarters, to which they would motor. Wire if this is convenient to Sherif Feisal and Lawrence. It is important the latter should be present at the interview.'32 In the event, however, Lawrence had left to join Nasir before the date of Weizmann's journey to Akaba was telegraphed from Cairo. He was therefore absent when the meeting took place on June 4th.
His place was taken by Joyce, who afterwards reported that the discussions lasted about forty-five minutes: 'Sherif Feisal expressed his opinion of the necessity for co-operation between Jews and Arabs . . . As regards definite political arrangements, [he] was unwilling to express an opinion, pointing out that in questions of politics he was acting merely as his father's agent and was not in a position to discuss them . . . Dr. Weizmann pointed out that the Jews do not propose setting up a Jewish government, but would like to work under British protection with a view to colonizing and developing the country without in any way encroaching on anybody's legitimate interests . . . Feisal declared that as an Arab he could not discuss the future of Palestine, either as a Jewish colony or a country under British Protection. These questions were already the subject of much German and Turkish propaganda, and would undoubtedly be misinterpreted by the Bedouin if openly discussed. Later on when Arab affairs were more consolidated these questions could be brought up.
'Sherif Feisal personally accepted the possibility of future Jewish claims to territory in Palestine . . . but he could not discuss them publicly'.33
It was only during a subsequent visit to Allenby's headquarters that Lawrence had an opportunity for significant discussions with Weizmann. Not long afterwards, when he was questioned on the topic by a member of Wingate's staff, he said: 'The real imminence of the Palestine problem is patent only to Feisal of the Sherifians. He believes that we intend to keep it ourselves, under the excuse of holding the balance between conflicting religions, and regards it as a cheap price to pay for the British help he has had and hopes still to have . . .
'Dr. Weizmann hopes for a completely Jewish Palestine in fifty years, and a Jewish Palestine, under a British façade, for the moment. He is fighting for his own lead among the British and American Jews: if he can offer these the spectacle of British help, and Arab willingness to allow Jewish enterprise free scope in all their provinces in Syria, he will then secure the financial backing which will make the new Judaea a reality . . . Weizmann is not yet in a position, as regards Jewry, to make good any promise he makes. In negotiating with him the Arabs would have to bear in mind that they are worth nothing to him till they have beaten the Turks, and that he is worth nothing to them unless he can make good amongst the Jews . . .
'Until the military adventure of the Arabs under Feisal has succeeded or failed, he does not require Jewish help, and it would be unwise on our part to permit it to be offered.'34
However, Lawrence thought that in the more distant future Feisal might have something to gain from co-operation with the Zionists. As soon as the Turks had been defeated, vociferous factions in Syria would turn against the Sherifians. Much of the upper-class intelligentsia would prefer autonomy, while the Maronite Christians and other pro-French elements would side with Paris in calling for the introduction of French advisers and capital. At this point Feisal might, with advantage, turn to the Zionists: 'If the British and American Jews, securely established under British colours in Palestine, chose this moment to offer to the Arab state in Syria help (1) against the Syrian autonomous elements, [and] (2) against the foreign railways, ports, roads, waterworks and power companies, Sherif Feisal would be compelled to accept the help, and with Anglo-Jewish advisers could dispense with the effendim and buy out the foreigners. This would give time for a development of an Arab spirit in Syria from below'.35
In June 1918, however, Lawrence was faced with more urgent questions
than the future relationship between Arabs and Zionists. The plans for an offensive were complete, and he was shortly to go to Egypt to make arrangements with GHQ and to seek Wingate's support for requesting the transfer of regulars from the Hejaz.
Notes
29. Foreign Office London to Sir F. R. Wingate, c.9.1.1918. CAB27/23.
30. G. F. Clayton to Sir T. B. M. Sykes, 4.2.1918. FO 371/3398 fo.620.
31. T. E. Lawrence to G. F. Clayton, 12.2.1918. FO882/7 fo. 268.
32. GHQ to Commandant Akaba, dispatch 2300, 24.5.1918. WO95/4370.
33. P. C. Joyce, 'Interview between Dr. Weizmann and Sherif Feisal' 5.6.1918. FO 882/14 fos. 364-5. Lawrence's absence from this meeting is confirmed by Arab Bulletin No. 93, 18.6.1918, p. 208. Weizmann later implied that Lawrence had been present (see Trial and Error, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1949 p. 292, and also a confused account in Friends, pp. 219-20. In both places Weizmann claims to have met Lawrence in June at or near Akaba.)
34. T. E. Lawrence, quoted in G. S. Symes, Tour of Duty (London, Collins, 1946) pp. 31-2. These notes were dictated by Lawrence, at Symes's request, while he was waiting for an aeroplane at Aboukir areodrome. Symes does not give a date, but it cannot be earlier than mid-June 1918, when Lawrence seems to have had his first serious talks with Weizmann. Clayton wrote on June 18th: 'Weizmann . . . has done very well with Faisal and at least has established excellent personal relations. He has also had long discussions with Lawrence, and they seem quite agreed on main principles' (G. F. Clayton to G. A. Lloyd 18.6.1918. Lloyd Papers GLLD 9/3. Churchill College, Cambridge). Lawrence's pocket diaries show that the date must be either June 15th or July 9th 1918.
35.Ibid. p. 32
Lawrence at the Eastern Committee of the British Cabinet, 29 October 1918 (Wilson pp. 376-7)
As regards French advisers [in Syria], 'Feisal took the view that he was free to choose whatever advisers he liked. He was anxious to obtain the assistance of British or American Zionist Jews for this purpose. The Ziuonists would be acceptable to the Arabs, on terms.'25
Note:
25. Minutes of the 37th meeting of the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet, 29.10.1918. CAB 27/24 fo.150.
Gilbert Clayton's views, November 1918 (Wilson pp. 582-3)
[On 1918 November 1918], a long telegram was received from Clayton. This began by setting out the attitudes of the local populations, area by area, and then discussed the implications of the Sykes-Picot Agreement: 'The arrangement for a division of the independent Arab area into an 'A' and 'B' sphere, the one controlled by France and the other by Great Britain, presents almost insuperable practical difficulties from an administrative point of view. If an Arab Government is to function with any degree of efficiency, it must have a system of administration applying equally to all areas under its control and operating from one central [point], which in this case must be Damascus.
'It is impracticable to divide the territories into two parts (one of which contains the capital) and to lay down that advice and assistance must come from France in the one half and from Great Britain in the other.
'For many years to come, advice and assistance to the newly formed Arab State must entail a considerable measure of actual administration. French and British methods of administration are widely different, and confusion and inefficiency must result. Worst of all, such an arrangement contains the seeds of future friction between France and Great Britain in a region where the policies of the two countries have been in opposition for many years.'39
In order to avoid such a clash, Clayton proposed that Britain should be the trustee of Palestine, and adviser to the independent Arab state based on Damascus (this should include the port of Tripoli and a coastal strip). France should be the trustee of an autonomous Lebanon including the Bekaa and Beirut, and also trustee and adviser to an autonomous Armenia (including the port of Alexandretta). Arrangements could easily be made to safeguard French economic interests in Syria, and any further concession to French imperial ambitions should be made elsewhere.
Clayton now had to deal with the practical consequences of the Balfour Declaration, and he added: 'a sound administration established at Damascus would permit . . . the development of the arable country to the east of the Jordan and the construction of communications to enable its produce to be exported with profit. The districts east of the Jordan are thinly populated and their development would allow . . . considerable emigration from Palestine thereby making room for Jewish expansion.
'It should be noted that it is essential to impress on the Zionists that the complete fulfilment of [their] aspirations cannot be looked for at once and that undue haste in pushing their programme will only react against their own interests.'40
There was thus unanimity among those who had dealt with the Arab question from Egypt during the preceding years. However, a long note from Monsieur Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, dispelled any illusion that his Government's policy had softened as a result of Feisal's contribution to the Allied victory. France now demanded that the Sykes-Picot terms, as agreed between Britain and France, should be fulfilled to the letter: 'on no point, whether at Damascus, Aleppo, or at Mosul, is [France] prepared to relinquish in any way the rights which she holds through the 1916 Agreement, whatever the provisional administrative arrangements called for by a passing military situation.'41
Notes:
39. G. F. Clayton to Foreign Office, London, telegram 190, 18.11.1918. FO371/3385 fos 174-5.
40. Ibid. fos 176-6
41. Note [to the Foreign Office] communicated by P. Cambon 18.11.1918. FO371/3385 fo. 163.
Meeting between Feisal and Weizmann, December 1918 (Wilson pp. 592-3)
On [11 December 1918], there was a meeting between Feisal and Chaim Weizmann, during which Lawrence acted as interpreter. Both leaders were now in a position to help one another politically: the Zionists needed Arab acquiescence to their programme in Palestine, while Feisal knew that Jewish support during the Peace Conference might help to swing American opinion behind his cause. Lawrence had already impressed upon Feisal the potential value of Jewish capital and skills.
According to his own contemporary account, Weizmann assured Feisal that the Zionists in Palestine 'should . . . be able to carry out public works of a far-reaching character, and . . . the country could be so improved that it would have room for four or five million Jews, without encroaching on the ownership rights of Arab peasantry.'61
Feisal replied that 'it was curious there should be friction between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. There was no friction in any other country where Jews lived together with Arabs . . . He did not think for a moment that there was any scarcity of land in Palestine. The population would always have enough, especially if the country were developed. Besides, there was plenty of land in his district.'62
Notes:
61. C. Weizmann: 'Dr. Weizmann's interview with Emir Faisal at the Carlton Hotel, December 11th 1918. Colonel Lawrence acting as interpreter.' FO371/3420.
62. Ibid. There were further contacts between Feisal and Weizmann in London, and on 3 January 1919 they signed an 'Agreement between the King of thre Hedjaz and the Zionists'. The text is reprinted in D. Hunter Miller, My Diaries of the Conference of Paris (New York, Appeal Printing, 1924), Vol. 3, p.p. 188-9.
The Arab Case, December 1918 (Wilson pp. 595-6)
During the last days of December, Lawrence and Feisal worked on a memorandum setting out the Arab case. This document would be Feisal's principal submission to the Peace Conference, and its tone was no less important than its content. His only remaining hope of success lay with the Americans, and the memorandum was therefore addressed directly to the idealism that was thought to inspire President Wilson's policy. A heavily amended draft, in Lawrence's handwriting, survives, but the memorandum was to be signed by Feisal. In its final form, it read: ' . . . In Palestine the enormous majority of the people are Arabs. The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood, and there is no conflict of character between the two races. In principles we are absolutely at one. Nevertheless, the Arabs cannot risk assuming the responsibility of holding level the scales in the clash of races and religions that have, in this one province, so often involved the world in difficulties. They would wish for the effective super-position of a great trustee, so long as a representative local administration commended itself by actively promoting the material prosperity of the country. . . .'70
Note:
70. 'Memorandum by the Emir Feisal'. FO 608/80 fo. 122. Lawrence's surviving manuscript (a slightly earlier draft) is Houghton MS Eng 1252 (341).
Clayton's views, March 1919 (Wilson pp. 601-3)
Another important figure was Clayton, whose opinions would doubtless have carried more weight if he had been free to leave his duties in the Middle East and attend the Paris Conference. As Allenby's chief political adviser, he had to deal personally with the situation that was developing in Syria and Palestine. He foresaw the consequences of an unsatisfactory settlement and, in a memorandum of March 11th, set out the British dilemma and its likely results. He wrote: 'We are committed to three distinct policies in Syria and Palestine:-
A. We are bound by the principles of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916 [Sykes-Picot], wherein we renounced any claim to predominant influence in Syria.
B. Our agreements with King Hussein . . . have pledged us to support the establishment of an Arab state, or confederation of states, from which we cannot exclude the purely Arab portions of Syria and Palestine.
C. We have definitely given our support to the principle of a Jewish home in Palestine and, although the initial outlines of the Zionist programme have been greatly exceeded by the proposals now laid before the Peace Congress, we are still committed to a large measure of support to Zionism.
'The experience of the last few months has made it clear that these three policies are incompatible . . . and that no compromise is possible which will be satisfactory to all three parties:-
a. French domination in Syria is repudiated by the Arabs of Syria, except by the Maronite Christians and a small minority amongst other sections of the population.
b. The formation of a homogeneous Arab State is impracticable under the dual control of two Powers whose system and methods of administration are so widely different as those of France and England.
c. Zionism is increasingly unpopular both in Syria and Palestine where the somewhat exaggerated programme put forward recently by the Zionist leaders has seriously alarmed all sections of the non-Jewish majority. The difficulty of carrying out a Zionist policy in Palestine will be enhanced if Syria is handed over to France and Arab confidence in Great Britain undermined thereby.
'It is impossible to discharge all our liabilities, and we are forced, therefore, to break, or modify, at least one of our agreements.'7
Clayton foresaw serious consequences if Britain handed Syria to France, and then sought to impose Zionism in Palestine: 'The French will certainly meet with great obstruction, and possibly armed resistance from the Arabs who will doubtless be supported by the Arabs of the Hedjaz sphere. Great Britain, as the controlling Power in Palestine, will be pressed by France to enforce the neutrality of beduins in the Palestine hinterland and to close the lines of communication between Hedjaz and Damascus. Our influence with the Arabs will have been greatly impaired, firstly by the fact that we shall be held to have sold Syria to the French, and secondly by our support of the unpopular Zionist programme.'8
In this situation, Clayton argued, Britain would have to maintain a costly army of occupation in Palestine and, 'by definitely alienating Arab sentiment,'9 would also incur very unfavourable consequences for British interests and influence in the Arabian Peninsula and even Mesopotamia.
This led to a conclusion which few British politicians at that time would have found palatable: if Britain did not take both Palestine and Syria, she should take neither of them: 'If France must have Syria it would be preferable that America, or some Power other than Great Britain or France, be given the Mandate for Palestine.' Clayton continued: 'The alternative is to offer to France such inducement as will lead her to renounce her claims in Syria, and to give to some other Power the mandate for both Syria and Palestine. It is only thus that a compromise might be arrived at, between Arab aspirations for a united and autonomous Syria and Zionist demands for a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine . . . In these circumstances the Power entrusted with the Mandate can only be America or Great Britain.'10
As the weeks passed, it became increasingly clear that Clayton was right. Both the British and American Delegations could foresee the additional difficulties which would face the Zionist programme in Palestine if the Arabs were alienated in Syria. Yet there was one immovable factor which prevented a satisfactory solution: namely the attitude of France.
Notes:
7. G. F. Clayton, memorandum, 11.3.1919. Lloyd George papers F/205/3/9. House of Lords.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
At the Peace Conference, 1919 (Wilson pp. 606-7)
The Zionist lobby was powerful in America as in Britain, and the Great Powers continued to ignore this conflict of principle, discouraging those who drew attention to it. Stephen Bonsal, one of the aides in the American Delegation, was embarrassed when Lawrence brought to him a draft memorandum in which Feisal expressed mounting anxiety on the matter. In outline, according to Bonsal's memoirs, the memorandum ran: 'If the views of the radical Zionists, as presented to the [Peace Conference], should prevail, the result will be a ferment, chronic unrest, and sooner or later civil war in Palestine. But I hope I will not be misunderstood. I assert that we Arabs have none of the racial or religious animosity against the Jews which unfortunately prevail in many other regions of the world. I assert that with the Jews who have been seated for some generations in Palestine our relations are excellent. But the new arrivals exhibit very different qualities from those "old settlers" as we call them, with whom we have been able to live and even co-operate on friendly terms. For want of a better word I must say that new colonists almost without exception have come in an imperialistic spirit. They say that too long we have been in control of their homeland taken from them by brute force in the dark ages, but that now under the new world order we must clear out; and if we are wise we should do so peaceably without making any resistance to what is the fiat of the civilised world.'23
Note.
23. S. Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants, The Little Nations at Versailles (New York, Prentice Hall, 1946) p. 56.
From 'The Changing East' [by T.E. Lawrence, unsigned], Round Table, September 1920
Two new elements of some interest have just set foot in Asia, coming rather as adventurers by sea - the Greeks in Smyrna, and the Jews in Palestine. Of the two efforts the Greek is frankly an armed occupation - a desire to hold a tit-bit of Asiatic Turkey, for reasons of trade and population, and from it to influence affairs in the interior. It appears to have no constructive possibilities so far as the New Asia is concerned. The Jewish experiment is in another class. It is a conscious effort, on the part of the least European people in Europe, to make head against the drift of the ages, and return once more to the Orient from which they came. The colonists will take back with them to the land which they occupied for some centuries before the Christian era samples of all the knowledge and technique of Europe. They propose to settle down amongst the existing Arabic-speaking population of the country, a people of kindred origin, but far different social condition. They hope to adjust their mode of life to the climate of Palestine, and by the exercise of their skill and capital to make it as highly organised as a European state. The success of their scheme will involve inevitably the raising of the present Arab population to their own material level, only a little after themselves in point of time, and the consequences might be of the highest importance for the future of the Arab world. It might well prove a source of technical supply rendering them independent of industrial Europe, and in that case the new confederation might become a formidable element of world power. However, such a contingency will not be for the first or even for the second generation, but it must be borne in mind in any laying out of foundations of empire in Western Asia. These to a very large extent must stand or fall by the course of the Zionist effort, and by the course of events in Russia.
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"We want no progress, no prosperity. Nothing but the sword will decide the fate of this country." --
Haj Amin El Husseini - Palestinian leader and former Grand Mufti, reviewing Nazi Troops.
Palestinian leader, Former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin Al Husseini, shown reviewing Nazi troops on the cover of the Vienna Illustrated (Wiener Illustrierte) magazine.
Meeting between Feisal and Weizmann, December 1918 (Wilson pp. 592-3)
On [11 December 1918], there was a meeting between Feisal and Chaim Weizmann, during which Lawrence acted as interpreter. Both leaders were now in a position to help one another politically: the Zionists needed Arab acquiescence to their programme in Palestine, while Feisal knew that Jewish support during the Peace Conference might help to swing American opinion behind his cause. Lawrence had already impressed upon Feisal the potential value of Jewish capital and skills.
According to his own contemporary account, Weizmann assured Feisal that the Zionists in Palestine 'should . . . be able to carry out public works of a far-reaching character, and . . . the country could be so improved that it would have room for four or five million Jews, without encroaching on the ownership rights of Arab peasantry.'61
Feisal replied that 'it was curious there should be friction between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. There was no friction in any other country where Jews lived together with Arabs . . . He did not think for a moment that there was any scarcity of land in Palestine. The population would always have enough, especially if the country were developed. Besides, there was plenty of land in his district.'62
Notes:
61. C. Weizmann: 'Dr. Weizmann's interview with Emir Faisal at the Carlton Hotel, December 11th 1918. Colonel Lawrence acting as interpreter.' FO371/3420.
62. Ibid. There were further contacts between Feisal and Weizmann in London, and on 3 January 1919 they signed an 'Agreement between the King of thre Hedjaz and the Zionists'. The text is reprinted in D. Hunter Miller, My Diaries of the Conference of Paris (New York, Appeal Printing, 1924), Vol. 3, p.p. 188-9.
T. E. Lawrence and Zionism
Extracts from Lawrence of Arabia, The Authorised Biography by Jeremy Wilson (London, Heinemann, 1989; New York, Atheneum, 1990) and other sources.
In quoting these extracts in isolation, we have assumed that readers have a general knowledge of the diplomatic background, the history of undertakings given by Britain to the Arabs, and the progress of the war in the Middle East.
Meetings between Lawrence and Aaron Aaronsohn, a radical Zionist, Jerusalem, 1917
[Aaronsohn] had met Lawrence as early as February 1917, and had noted in his diary, '. . . A new appearance in the Arab Bureau - 2nd Lieutenant Lawrence, archaeologist, very versed in Palestinian topics. Overbearing.'
On 12 August 1917, according to the diary, they met again. 'This morning I had a conversation with Capt. Lawrence. An interview without any evidence of friendliness. Lawrence had too much success at too early an age. Has a very high estimation of his own self. He is lecturing me on our colonies, on the spirit of the people, on the feelings of the Arabs, and we would do well in being assimilated by them, by the sons of Arab etc. While listening to him I imagined to be present at the lecture of a Prussian scientific anti-Semite expressing himself in English. I am afraid that many of the archaeologists and reverends have been imbued by 'l'esprit boche'. He is openly against us. He is basically of missionary stock'
Harsh words indeed; in contradiction of the words used by Weizmann. As far as we know Aaronsohn did not change his mind. He continued to see in T. E. Lawrence the close associate of Feisal, the 'Bedouins' and the 'Arabs' of whom he had the lowest opinion.
Source: Amram Scheyer, 'The Lawrence - Aaronsohn Relationship' Journal of the T. E. Lawrence Society, Vol. V, No. 1, Autumn 1995. This article is available online.
1) T. E. Lawrence's letter to Sir Mark Sykes, 9 September 1917 (Wilson pp. 442-3)
[Sir Mark] Sykes's letter to [Gilbert] Clayton [of 22 July 1917*] also contained a passing reference to the Zionist question. It was well known that he was interested in this subject, and the British staff in Egypt also knew that some kind of discussions on the matter were taking place in London. Jewish ambitions in Palestine were common knowledge in Cairo, where Aaron Aaronson, a prominent figure in the movement, was hoping to set up a Zionist office. Lawrence had good reason to be interested in a question that so obviously affected the aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs.
On September 7th, he wrote to Sykes at length, asking both about Zionist aims and about the future of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. He sent this letter to Clayton, with the comment: 'Some of it is really thirst for information, and other is only a wish to stick pins into him . . . One must have the Jewish section cleared up: and I fancy we may (if we win) clear up the French section ourselves.'15
Lawrence wrote to Sykes: 'General Clayton showed me a letter from you which contained a message to myself - and this has prompted me to ask you a few queries about Near East affairs. I hope you will be able to give me an idea of how matters stand in reference to them, since part of the responsibility of action is inevitably thrown on to me, and unless I know more or less what is wanted there might be trouble.
'About the Jews in Palestine, Feisal has agreed not to operate or agitate west of the [Wadi] Araba-Dead Sea-Jordan line, or south of the Haifa-Beisan line . . .
'You know of course the root differences between the Palestine Jew and the colonist Jew: to Feisal the important point is that the former speak Arabic, and the latter German Yiddish. He is in touch with the Arab Jews (their H.Q. at Safed and Tiberias is in his sphere) and they are ready to help him, on conditions. They show a strong antipathy to the colonist Jews, and have even suggested repressive measures against them. Feisal has ignored this point hitherto, and will continue to do so. His attempts to get into touch with the colonial Jews have not been very fortunate. They say they have made their arrangements with the Great Powers, and wish no contact with the Arab Party. They will not help the Turks or the Arabs.
'Now Feisal wants to know (information had better come to me for him since I usually like to make up my mind before he does) what is the arrangement standing between the colonist Jews (called Zionists sometimes) and the Allies . . . What have you promised the Zionists, and what is their programme?
'I saw Aaronson in Cairo, and he said at once the Jews intended to acquire the land-rights of all Palestine from Gaza to Haifa, and have practical autonomy therein. Is this acquisition to be by fair purchase or by forced sale and expropriation? The present half-crop peasantry were the old freeholders and under Moslem landlords may be ground down but have fixity of tenure. Arabs are usually not employed by Jewish colonies. Do the Jews propose the complete expulsion of the Arab peasantry, or their reduction to a day-labourer class?
'You know how the Arabs cling even to bad land and will realise that while Arab feelings didn't matter under Turkish rule . . . the condition will be vastly different if there is a new, independent, and rather cock-a-hoop Arab state north and east and south of the Jewish state.
I can see a situation arising in which the Jewish influence in European finance might not be sufficient to deter the Arab peasants from refusing to quit - or worse!
* Sir T. B. M. Sykes to G. F. Clayton 22.7.1917. Sykes Papers, St. Antony's College, Oxford.
Note 15. T. E. Lawrence to G. F. Clayton 7.9.1917. Clayton Pape5rs 693/11/9-12, Durham (photocopy of original).
2. Sykes-Picot and the Balfour Declaration published (Wilson pp. 467-9)
Lawrence's visit to Cairo [in December1917] also enabled him to catch up on Intelligence about recent political developments. Among the most serious questions to be faced were those which had been raised by the Bolshevik Revolution of early November. The new Russian regime was vehemently opposed to the war and had taken immediate steps to reach an armistice with the Central Powers. This meant that Turkey would soon be able to transfer troops from the Caucasus Front to Palestine and Mesopotamia.
The Revolution had another disconcerting consequence. Within days of seizing control, the Bolsheviks had published secret Allied treaties including the Sykes-Picot Agreement. During the following weeks, these texts had appeared in newspapers throughout the world. The Sykes-Picot terms were a gift to Turkish propaganda, and British officials had waited anxiously for Arab reaction.
This had not been slow in coming. On November 26th, Wilson reported that Hussein had 'hinted that H. M. Government possibly had some secret understanding with France and that Zeid and Feisal were being delayed by us from advancing north on this account . . . the King expressed his distrust of French policy and . . . stated that Syria was his . . . His honour was concerned . . . as he had promised the Syrians he would give them help and never desert them.'11
It was feared that Arab support might disappear completely unless the Allies took some step to counteract the damage done by the Sykes-Picot revelation. The situation was made still more fraught by the release, at much the same time, of the Balfour Declaration, which provided for a Jewish 'national home' in Palestine. Reviewing the situation, Clayton wrote to Sykes: 'The lack of any definite pronouncement against annexation, especially in Syria, is causing distrust and uneasiness . . . The general principles of the Anglo-French Agreement are known, but there is still no certain knowledge of Entente intentions for the future. As regards Syria, there is an impression that we may be only marking time until our military successes place us in a position to hand [it] over to France with as few pledges as possible. This suspicion is ever present in the mind of the Sherif of Mecca . . .
'The recent announcement of His Majesty's Government on the Jewish question has made a profound impression on both Christians and Moslems who view with little short of dismay the prospect of seeing Palestine and even eventually Syria in the hands of the Jews, whose superior intelligence and commercial abilities are feared . . .
'All the above facts tend to prepare the ground for German-inspired . . . propaganda and pave the way for an attractive proposal [to the Arabs] for independence under nominal Turkish suzerainty . . .'12
Notes:
11. C. E. Wilson to Arab Bureau for Sir F. R, Wingate, telegram W1966, 16.11.1917. FO 141/654/356.
12. G. F. Clayton to Sir T. B. M. Sykes, transmitted in Sir F. R. Wingate to Foreign Office, London, telegram 1281, 28.11.1917. Sykes Papers, St. Antony's College, Oxford.
The situation in May 1918 (Wilson pp. 502-3)
Lawrence realised that the delay in Palestine [because Allenby was obliged to return troops to Europe] would be a severe blow to the Arabs. In the first place, he had been counting on Allenby's forward movement to resolve the dangerous stalemate at Maan. Now, however, the Turks would be free to concentrate their attention on Jaafar Pasha's army. They were already building up their forces near Amman, and an attack seemed imminent. If they were allowed to move south, the Arabs might soon be driven back off the Maan plateau.
In the longer term, the delay could have even more serious consequences. Lawrence later wrote: 'We on the Arab front had been exciting Eastern Syria, since 1916, for a revolt near Damascus, and our material was now ready and afoot. To hold it still in that excited readiness during another year risked our over-passing the crisis ineffectually.'1
The risk of declining morale among Feisal's present forces was no less worrying: 'This was now 1918, and stalemate across its harvest would have marked the ebb of Feisal's movement. His fellows were living on their nerves (rebellion is harder than war) and their nerves were wearing thin. Also the big war was not looking too well.'2
These difficulties had to be seen in the context of a much wider anxiety. Since the autumn of 1917, the Anglo-Arab alliance had been under great strain. The cause was Arab knowledge of the Sykes-Picot terms (greatly exploited by Turkish propaganda) and of the Balfour Declaration. These agreements affected Syria, Lebanon, Mesopotamia and Palestine. If they were implemented, only the Arabian Peninsula would be autonomous. In other words, the richest and most fertile of the Arab provinces had been reserved for the Allies, and political independence was to be denied to the overwhelming majority of Turkey's subject peoples. Arab leaders felt cheated of much that they had been fighting for, and bitterly angry that they had not been consulted about these agreements.
Their principal reason for continuing the alliance with Britain was a belief that the Allies would win the war. During the spring of 1918, however, even this seemed open to doubt. The EEF advance to Jerusalem and Jericho had been impressive, but there it had stopped, to be followed only by two disastrous raids across the Jordan which had done immeasurable damage to British prestige. Arab suspicions that the Allies might be weakening had been reinforced by news of the successful German offensive in Europe.3
Notes
1. T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars, 1922 text, Chapter 110.
2. T. E. Lawrence, comment on the typescript draft of 'T.E. Lawrence' in Arabia and After by B. H. Liddell Hart. B:LH pp 113-4.
3. German forces had launched a major offensive on the Western Front on 21 March 1918 and, within four months, recovered all the territory that the Allies had gained since 1915.
3. Weizmann's meeting with Emir Feisal, 4 June 1918 (Wilson pp. 512-14)
There had been another important diplomatic contact while Lawrence was away in the north. This was a visit to Feisal's camp by Dr Chaim Weizmann, a leading British Zionist. Some weeks earlier, Weizmann had arrived in Palestine at the head of a Zionist Commission authorised by the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet. The Commission's objects, according to a telegram to Wingate from the Foreign Office, were 'to carry out, subject to General Allenby's authority, any steps required to give effect to the Government declaration in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people . . . Among the important functions of the Commission will be the establishment of good relations with the Arabs and other non-Jewish communities in Palestine . . . It is most important that everything should be done to . . . allay Arab suspicions regarding the true aims of Zionism'.29
Clayton, who was closely involved in the administration of Palestine, hoped that the mission would help to reduce hostility between Jews and Arabs. He had written to Sykes on February 4th: 'I have urged Lawrence to impress on Faisal the necessity of an entente with the Jews. [Feisal] is inclined the other way, and there are people in Cairo who lose no chance of putting him against them. I have explained that it is his only chance of doing really big things and bringing the Arab movement to fruition.'30 Subsequently, Lawrence had told Clayton: '[As] for the Jews, when I see Feisul next I'll talk to him, and the Arab attitude shall be sympathetic, for the duration of the war at least. Only please remember that he is under the old man, and cannot involve the Arab kingdom by himself.' He would advise Feisal to visit Jerusalem when the demands of the campaign permitted, and 'all the Jews there will report him friendly. That will probably do all you need, without public commitment, which is rather beyond my province.'31
In late May, a message had been sent to Akaba proposing a meeting between Feisal and Weizmann, who would be accompanied by a liaison officer: 'The interview would take place at Arab Headquarters, to which they would motor. Wire if this is convenient to Sherif Feisal and Lawrence. It is important the latter should be present at the interview.'32 In the event, however, Lawrence had left to join Nasir before the date of Weizmann's journey to Akaba was telegraphed from Cairo. He was therefore absent when the meeting took place on June 4th.
His place was taken by Joyce, who afterwards reported that the discussions lasted about forty-five minutes: 'Sherif Feisal expressed his opinion of the necessity for co-operation between Jews and Arabs . . . As regards definite political arrangements, [he] was unwilling to express an opinion, pointing out that in questions of politics he was acting merely as his father's agent and was not in a position to discuss them . . . Dr. Weizmann pointed out that the Jews do not propose setting up a Jewish government, but would like to work under British protection with a view to colonizing and developing the country without in any way encroaching on anybody's legitimate interests . . . Feisal declared that as an Arab he could not discuss the future of Palestine, either as a Jewish colony or a country under British Protection. These questions were already the subject of much German and Turkish propaganda, and would undoubtedly be misinterpreted by the Bedouin if openly discussed. Later on when Arab affairs were more consolidated these questions could be brought up.
'Sherif Feisal personally accepted the possibility of future Jewish claims to territory in Palestine . . . but he could not discuss them publicly'.33
It was only during a subsequent visit to Allenby's headquarters that Lawrence had an opportunity for significant discussions with Weizmann. Not long afterwards, when he was questioned on the topic by a member of Wingate's staff, he said: 'The real imminence of the Palestine problem is patent only to Feisal of the Sherifians. He believes that we intend to keep it ourselves, under the excuse of holding the balance between conflicting religions, and regards it as a cheap price to pay for the British help he has had and hopes still to have . . .
'Dr. Weizmann hopes for a completely Jewish Palestine in fifty years, and a Jewish Palestine, under a British façade, for the moment. He is fighting for his own lead among the British and American Jews: if he can offer these the spectacle of British help, and Arab willingness to allow Jewish enterprise free scope in all their provinces in Syria, he will then secure the financial backing which will make the new Judaea a reality . . . Weizmann is not yet in a position, as regards Jewry, to make good any promise he makes. In negotiating with him the Arabs would have to bear in mind that they are worth nothing to him till they have beaten the Turks, and that he is worth nothing to them unless he can make good amongst the Jews . . .
'Until the military adventure of the Arabs under Feisal has succeeded or failed, he does not require Jewish help, and it would be unwise on our part to permit it to be offered.'34
However, Lawrence thought that in the more distant future Feisal might have something to gain from co-operation with the Zionists. As soon as the Turks had been defeated, vociferous factions in Syria would turn against the Sherifians. Much of the upper-class intelligentsia would prefer autonomy, while the Maronite Christians and other pro-French elements would side with Paris in calling for the introduction of French advisers and capital. At this point Feisal might, with advantage, turn to the Zionists: 'If the British and American Jews, securely established under British colours in Palestine, chose this moment to offer to the Arab state in Syria help (1) against the Syrian autonomous elements, [and] (2) against the foreign railways, ports, roads, waterworks and power companies, Sherif Feisal would be compelled to accept the help, and with Anglo-Jewish advisers could dispense with the effendim and buy out the foreigners. This would give time for a development of an Arab spirit in Syria from below'.35
In June 1918, however, Lawrence was faced with more urgent questions
than the future relationship between Arabs and Zionists. The plans for an offensive were complete, and he was shortly to go to Egypt to make arrangements with GHQ and to seek Wingate's support for requesting the transfer of regulars from the Hejaz.
Notes
29. Foreign Office London to Sir F. R. Wingate, c.9.1.1918. CAB27/23.
30. G. F. Clayton to Sir T. B. M. Sykes, 4.2.1918. FO 371/3398 fo.620.
31. T. E. Lawrence to G. F. Clayton, 12.2.1918. FO882/7 fo. 268.
32. GHQ to Commandant Akaba, dispatch 2300, 24.5.1918. WO95/4370.
33. P. C. Joyce, 'Interview between Dr. Weizmann and Sherif Feisal' 5.6.1918. FO 882/14 fos. 364-5. Lawrence's absence from this meeting is confirmed by Arab Bulletin No. 93, 18.6.1918, p. 208. Weizmann later implied that Lawrence had been present (see Trial and Error, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1949 p. 292, and also a confused account in Friends, pp. 219-20. In both places Weizmann claims to have met Lawrence in June at or near Akaba.)
34. T. E. Lawrence, quoted in G. S. Symes, Tour of Duty (London, Collins, 1946) pp. 31-2. These notes were dictated by Lawrence, at Symes's request, while he was waiting for an aeroplane at Aboukir areodrome. Symes does not give a date, but it cannot be earlier than mid-June 1918, when Lawrence seems to have had his first serious talks with Weizmann. Clayton wrote on June 18th: 'Weizmann . . . has done very well with Faisal and at least has established excellent personal relations. He has also had long discussions with Lawrence, and they seem quite agreed on main principles' (G. F. Clayton to G. A. Lloyd 18.6.1918. Lloyd Papers GLLD 9/3. Churchill College, Cambridge). Lawrence's pocket diaries show that the date must be either June 15th or July 9th 1918.
35.Ibid. p. 32
Lawrence at the Eastern Committee of the British Cabinet, 29 October 1918 (Wilson pp. 376-7)
As regards French advisers [in Syria], 'Feisal took the view that he was free to choose whatever advisers he liked. He was anxious to obtain the assistance of British or American Zionist Jews for this purpose. The Ziuonists would be acceptable to the Arabs, on terms.'25
Note:
25. Minutes of the 37th meeting of the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet, 29.10.1918. CAB 27/24 fo.150.
Gilbert Clayton's views, November 1918 (Wilson pp. 582-3)
[On 1918 November 1918], a long telegram was received from Clayton. This began by setting out the attitudes of the local populations, area by area, and then discussed the implications of the Sykes-Picot Agreement: 'The arrangement for a division of the independent Arab area into an 'A' and 'B' sphere, the one controlled by France and the other by Great Britain, presents almost insuperable practical difficulties from an administrative point of view. If an Arab Government is to function with any degree of efficiency, it must have a system of administration applying equally to all areas under its control and operating from one central [point], which in this case must be Damascus.
'It is impracticable to divide the territories into two parts (one of which contains the capital) and to lay down that advice and assistance must come from France in the one half and from Great Britain in the other.
'For many years to come, advice and assistance to the newly formed Arab State must entail a considerable measure of actual administration. French and British methods of administration are widely different, and confusion and inefficiency must result. Worst of all, such an arrangement contains the seeds of future friction between France and Great Britain in a region where the policies of the two countries have been in opposition for many years.'39
In order to avoid such a clash, Clayton proposed that Britain should be the trustee o